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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a set of modifications to the 
on-chip debugging infrastructures present in many 
actual microprocessor cores, with the objective of 
supporting the validation and verification steps of 
fault-tolerant mechanisms through fault injection 
campaigns. A synthesisable microprocessor core for 
programmable components was used as a target 
system an. a debugging infrastructure compliant 
with the NEXUS 5001 proposed standard for on-
chip debugging was implemented on this target. To 
improve the process of real-time memory fault 
injection, an upgraded infrastructure designated as 
On-Chip Debugging and Fault Injection (OCD-FI) 
was developed. The complete system was analysed 
in terms of area overhead and fault injection 
capabilities and performance. All elements were 
designed as synthesizable VHDL modules and 
evaluated in simulation.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in 
the use of microprocessor-based systems in critical 
areas where failures imply risks to human lives, the 
environment or expensive equipment. One solution 
for avoiding a possible disaster lays in the use of 
dependable systems, able to tolerate and eventually 
correct faults, requiring high quality validation & 
verification in their development cycle. 
Most recent microprocessors include an on-chip 
debugging (OCD) infrastructure to facilitate 
common debug operations. Although these vary 
considerably from case to case, they usually include 
a similar set of features like memory read and write, 
instruction single-stepping, program trace and some 
type of breakpoint support. 
The motivation behind the work described in this 
paper is the belief that it is possible to develop a 
efficient fault injection methodology using a 
modified debugging infrastructure. The objective is 
to provide additional capabilities and an increase in 
performance of the fault injection process. 
2. State of the Art 
 
In safety critical computer based applications 
dependability is of utmost importance. Dependable 
systems are designed to detect errors that originate 
from software or hardware faults and recover from 
them maintaining acceptable operating conditions. 
The verification and validation of these systems is 
an important and hard to handle problem, although 
benefiting from some proposed solutions such as: 
analytical modeling, experimental techniques and 
fault injection [1]. Fault injection is recognized as a 
powerful solution, particularly to measure the 
effectiveness of the error detection mechanisms. It 
consists of injecting faults in the system 
components, while functional applications are being 
executed, and then observing the system response. 
The hardest part of this approach is the 
methodology for actually injecting the fault, namely 
how to access those elements of the microprocessor 
where faults are more probable, generally the 
memory elements and communication buses. 
The efficiency of a fault injection technique 
depends on the controllability and observability 
level of each microprocessor. Nowadays, almost 
every microprocessor comes with a debug & test 
infrastructure which provides a reasonable mean to 
access its core. However, such infrastructures are 
generally based on different architectures and access 
ports, normally requiring specific hardware and 
often with proprietary parts. 
IEEE-ISTO 5001-1999, the NEXUS 5001 Forum 
Standard for a Global Embedded Processor Debug 
Interface [2] is an open industry standard that 
provides a general-purpose interface for the software 
development and debug of embedded processors. 
This proposed standard is an interesting possibility 
for the development of a common fault injection 
methodology for the verification and validation of 
critical microprocessor-based systems. 
Most fault injection techniques that use on-chip 
debugging infrastructures rely on halting the 
processor, either by the use of control signals or 
using breakpoints, and subsequently modify the 
targeted registers or memory locations to emulate a 
fault. The usual approach involves the use of a host 
machine running the fault injection campaign and a 
debugger to access the target infrastructure. 
The NEXUS proposed standard offers some 
interesting possibilities, as it allows real time access 
to memory and trace information. Work on this area 
has confirmed the importance of these capabilities 
[3] for fault injection purposes, and allowed the 
identification of some shortcomings in 
synchronization and performance.  
 As all the available NEXUS compliant 
debuggers communicate with the outside world 
through either Ethernet or USB cables, this imposes 
a critical limitation on real time fault injection in 
high performance systems. Depending on the 
memory position targeted, it may prove difficult or 
even impossible to read its contents and write back a 
modified value before it is actually written by the 
running application. 
Fault Triggering is also a problem as even using 
a debugger [4] that outputs trace data without halting 
the processor, this information is not readily 
available as it must reach the host machine before it 
can be acted upon, and this delay can be measured in 
milliseconds or more, which effectively prevents its 
use as a triggering solution. 
 
3. Target System 
 
The choice of target system was made with some 
key features in mind. It had to be freely available as 
a fully synthesizable VHDL (or Verilog) model. The 
possibility of using different processor 
configurations and the ease of modification were 
important selection factors. The actual 
implementations of the device and the available 
documentation were also considered. 
The final choice fell on a publicly available 
opencores [5] project, namely the cpugenerator [6] 
building tool. This tool allows for the automatic 
creation of 4, 8, 16 or 32 bit microprocessor cores. 
In cpugenerator, data and address buses can be 
configured and several RAM and ROM types can be 
used, including the possibility of implementing a 
single RAM block for data and program storage. The 
instruction set is pre-defined, but it is possible to add 
new instructions. Interrupt support and stack 
configuration are also configurable. 
A compiler tool is also provided to translate 
assembler (text) files into object files, readable by 
VHDL memory simulation modules. The tool output 
is a set of VHDL files that compose the 
microprocessor core and some additional (non-
synthesizable) files that allow RAM and ROM 
emulation. It is also possible to use synthesizable 
memory definitions, but in this case the memory 
contents must be created manually.  
The target applications used were two 
specifically designed programs. The first, designated 
as iset_test, consists of a test program that executes 
all instructions present in the original cpugenerator 
instruction set. A second program is the 
matrix_addFT which is a matrix adding application 
with fault tolerant characteristics. These consist of 
duplicating each arithmetic operation and then 
comparing the results, with any difference triggering 
an error detection routine. Although not as powerful 
as hardware fault tolerance, this solution allows for 
some degree of fault tolerance without modifications 
to the hardware, at the cost of some ROM memory 
space. 
 
4. Debugging Infrastructure 
 
The implemented debugging infrastructure was 
designed from the beginning to be compliant with 
the NEXUS 5001 proposed standard. This option 
was taken with so that the subsequent modifications 
could be applied to all compliant infrastructures. 
As there is no mandatory implementation, the 
OCD design was based on the infrastructure present 
on the MPC565 microcontroller, which is a well 
documented NEXUS compliant device. The 
objective was to implement a Class-2 compliant 
infrastructure as configurable as the target system. It 
should be compatible with the different CPU 
configurations and also automatically generated. 
The NEXUS proposed standard defines the 
minimum set of features and the communication port 
to be used on a compliant infrastructure. For a class 
2 compliant device the required features are: 
• Read/Write User Registers in Debug Mode 
• Read/Write User Memory in Real Time 
• Enter a Debug Mode from Reset /  User Mode 
• Exit Debug Mode to User Mode 
• Single step instruction in User Mode and re-enter 
Debug Mode 
• Stop Program execution on instruction/data 
breakpoint and enter Debug Mode (minimum 2 
breakpoints) 
• Ability to send out an event occurrence when 
watchpoint matches 
• Ability to set breakpoint or watchpoint conditions 
• Device identification Message 
The communication protocol is defined in the 
standard and is message based. Each message 
consists of a code defining the message type and 
additional data packets if required. The 
infrastructure accepts command messages in this 
form and outputs result messages 
As to the NEXUS port, it must include the 
following signals: 
• Two clocks for messaging input and output 
control. 
• Message Data Buses (Output and Input) for data 
communication. Depending upon bandwidth 
requirements, one, two, four, eight, or more pins 
may be implemented for each bus. 
• Message Start/End (Output and Input) indicate 
when a message on the respective data bus has 
started, when a variable-length packet has ended, 
and when the message has ended.  
• Two event pins (Output and Input) with the input 
pin allowing halting the processor and the output 
pin indicating exact timing for a single breakpoint 
status indication.  
• A Reset pin for resetting the Nexus infrastructure. 
The implemented OCD infrastructure is divided 
in three modules as seen on Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1- OCD Infrastructure 
The RCT (Run Control & Trace) module is 
responsible for CPU run control and bus snooping. It 
receives commands both from the MSG module and 
the RW module and outputs trace data and 
watchpoint hit signals. 
The RW (Read & Write) module is used both to 
access debug specific registers and CPU resources 
(memory and registers). This module uses a special 
register (RAW) where data and access information is 
stored so that a single triggering signal may order 
the execution of a single read/write operation.  
The MMQ (Message Management and Queuing) 
module is the NEXUS message handler that 
translates all debugging operations into messages 
and vice versa and manages the message queues.  
Some additional logic is required to deal with 
signal multiplexing, collision handling and timing 
issues. 
All required NEXUS features were implemented, 
being possible to insert up to two program and one 
data breakpoint. Both types of breakpoints can be 
activated at the N occurrence of their trigger 
condition. Additionally a watchpoint may be 
generated in the same manner as either type of 
breakpoint. Program trace is performed by sending 
out messages at program branch or exception 
occurrences. If enabled, data trace can be performed 
by messaging out data values and addresses at 
memory write instants. 
5. On-Chip Fault Injection 
 
Any NEXUS compliant OCD infrastructure 
already has both triggering and data access 
capabilities, in the form of watchpoint support and 
read/write access to microprocessor registers and 
memory. 
On-Chip Fault Injection (OCD-FI) can be 
described as a hardware module implemented on the 
microprocessor chip that uses the available 
debugging functions to automatically inject faults.  
The proposed solution was developed with three 
objectives: Simplicity, adaptability and efficiency. It 
has to be simple to imply the least logic overhead, it 
should be adaptable so that it can be configured for 
different microprocessor architectures and it has to 
be efficient to justify its use. 
OCD-FI consists off adding an additional Fault 
Injection (FI) module to a (NEXUS compliant) OCD 
infrastructure. This module, when enabled, monitors 
the watchpoint signal(s) so that it can activate a 
memory write operation to inject a bit-flip fault on a 
given address. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Fault Injection Module 
This approach requires that both the data value to 
be written and the respective address be determined 
beforehand and preloaded in the RAW register. To 
do this it is necessary a previous analysis of the 
running application to determine the target memory 
position contents at the injection instant. In this 
manner it is possible to determine the value that 
should be stored so that a single bit-flip is caused on 
the target. 
The required data must be downloaded to the 
OCD infrastructure prior to the watchpoint 
occurrence, and the RW module must not be used 
until the actual fault activation. 
Once the fault is inserted the FI module disables 
itself and the OCD resources can then be used 
normally. It should be noted that the trace features 
are not affected by this and operate normally before, 
during and after the fault injection process, reacting 
exactly as if a “real” fault was injected. 
As the NEXUS proposed standard has support 
for additional (configurable) messages, it is possible 
to use these to control the fault injection module. In 
fact, the watchpoint configuration messages are 
already used for debugging purposes and it is only 
required to add support for messages to enable and 
disable the FI module and for the setting up of the 
address and data values for the actual fault injection. 
In this manner it should be very simple to add fault 
injection support to any NEXUS compliant 
debugging system. 
The fault model considered for this case derives 
from the most common fault scenarios for critical 
systems [7] and is defined as: 
 
Fault Type Bit-Flip 
Fault Location RAM memory space 
Fault Trigger Instruction Execution 
Fault Duration Transient 
Table 1 – Fault Model 
The fault type and duration were chosen to 
mirror the expected effects of radiation on the target 
system. The fault location is limited to RAM 
memory because it is in this area that the OCD-FI is 
most advantageous as fault injection can be 
performed in real-time. The fault trigger can be any 
instruction occurrence of the running application, 
covering the entire execution time.  
A fault campaign defines a set of fault injection 
runs where in each case a specific fault location and 
trigger is selected. In each such fault operation the 
processor is reset and the application runs from the 
beginning. The FI module can be programmed prior 
to this or even in runtime. The actual faulty value to 
be written depends on the target memory value at the 
moment of the injection. To determine this value 
beforehand it is possible to either use the knowledge 
of the running application code or perform a prior 
faultless application execution up to the fault 
triggering instant and use the OCD to read the 
relevant memory contents. The fault trigger is also 
selected beforehand from the executed application 
code. A complete fault campaign is generated 
externally and stored in memory as a sequence of 
commands for the OCD-FI infrastructure. Fault 
campaign management is performed using specific 
VHDL modules that use RAM memory blocks for 
reading the fault injection campaign data and storing 
the relevant results. This allows the use of a single 
programmable device (FPGA) for the entire fault 
injection process. 
 
6. Results 
 
The target system, the debugger, the fault 
injection module and the different memories were 
designed as VHDL models using the Xilinx ISE 7.1i 
[8] development environment and simulated using 
the Modelsim 6.0a simulation engine. The number 
of equivalent gate count for each module is given in 
Table 2 for two different CPU configurations.  
Fault campaigns were executed on both 
configurations and using both target applications. 
Each campaign was performed twice, one using the 
initial OCD version and other using also the FI 
module. Table 3 presents the timing for each fault 
injection operation in clock cycles. Set up represents 
the delay due to fault injection related activities 
performed before each fault injection run is started 
and writing represents the time interval between the 
fault activation condition being met and the actual 
insertion of the faulty value. 
 
8 bit CPU 32 bit CPU 
Module # Equivalent 
Gates % 
# Equivalent 
Gates % 
CPU core 9166 N/A 53717 N/A
RCT 2391 34 5113 27 
RW 369 5 643 3 
MMQ 4225 60 13045 69 
FI 75 1,1 75 0,4 
OCD-FI 7060 100 18876 100 
Debugger 
(except 
RAM) 
766 N/A 1079 N/A
Table 2 – Synthesis Results 
 OCD OCD-FI 
CPU Set up Writing Set up Writing 
8 bit 13 14 28 2 
32 bit 14 21 36 2 
Table 3 – Fault Injection Timings 
The obtained results show that the FI module 
allows the injection of bit-flip faults with minimum 
delay and requiring a very low logic overhead. As 
such, the proposed OCD-FI infrastructure should 
provide an efficient fault injection mechanism in 
terms of reusability, coverage, performance and cost. 
The downside is the need of an adequate OCD 
infrastructure and the required availability of both 
the OCD and the target CPU in some type of HDL 
description. 
Actually, different applications and fault 
injection scenarios are being used to further validate 
the OCD-FI infrastructure. Its applicability to other 
microprocessor and OCD architectures is also being 
studied.  
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